We estimate the stock market effects of the Tiger Woods scandal on his sponsors and sponsors' competitors. In the 10-15 trading days after the onset of the scandal the full portfolio of sponsors lost more than two percent of market value, with losses concentrated among the core three sponsors EA, Nike and PepsiCo (Gatorade). Sponsors' day-by-day losses correlate strongly with Google search intensity regarding the endorsement-related impact of the scandal, as well as with qualitative indicators of "endorsement-related news." At least some sponsors' losses were competitors' gains, suggesting that endorsement deals are partially a business-stealing strategy. However, competitors who were themselves celebrity endorsement-intensive fared relatively worse than those who were not endorsement-intensive, and that difference also correlates dayby-day with news/search intensity regarding the scandal. It appears that the scandal sent a negative market-wide signal about the reputation risk associated with celebrity endorsements.
Introduction
As of mid-2009 professional golfer Eldrick 'Tiger' Woods earned roughly $100 million annually in endorsement income, an amount far greater than that earned by any other athlete. On November 27, 2009, Woods was involved in a car accident outside his home. Following the accident, a series of news reports about both the crash and Woods' personal life damaged his public reputation, and several sponsors either stopped featuring him or dropped him outright. In this paper we estimate the stock market effects of the scandal, for both the sponsor firms and their competitors. Some of those competitors are themselves "endorsement-intensive" (but have no deal with Tiger Woods), while others have no celebrity endorsement deals.
Our empirics address several key questions about celebrity endorsements, firm value and business strategy. Does firm value depend materially on investments in celebrity endorsements? If so, do sponsors' gains and losses from celebrity endorsements represent net market value creation/destruction, or business-stealing from other firms? And, does the stock market reflect changing expectations about the "reputation risk" that firms take on by attaching their brands to celebrities? Previous work on celebrity sponsorship almost exclusively focuses on the first question, rather than the latter two. And, most previous work focuses only on stock market effects, while we also bring to bear auxiliary data from Google Insights, allowing us to correlate endorsement-related news/search intensity with changes in firm value.
Our first empirical finding is that between the car accident and Woods' announcement ten trading days later of an 'indefinite leave' from golf, his sponsors' overall market value declined by over two percentage points. Narrower groups of "Primary" firms with the biggest endorsement contracts, or that had made large complementary investments in the "Tiger brand," lost more in percentage terms. The losses grow further by fifteen trading days after the accident.
We sharpen the empirics by showing a strong relationship between daily abnormal returns and several measures of endorsement-related news/search intensity during the scandal. For example, during the scandal sponsors' losses are greater on days when the search term "Tiger Woods endorsement" is more popular on Google, a result that is statistically significant and economically substantive. For Woods' core three "Tiger Brand" sponsors Google search intensity explains over thirty percent of variation in abnormal returns during the fifteen trading days after the onset of the scandal; the figure is lower but still significant for the full set of sponsors. The quantitative search intensity outperforms an author-defined variable denoting significant "endorsement-related 1 news days."
We also estimate stock price changes for sponsors' competitors. We find that as sponsors lost market value, competitors gained market value, as long as those competitors were themselves not heavily invested in celebrity endorsements. Sponsors' competitors with at least one celebrity endorsement deal experienced returns that are statistically significantly smaller than those experienced by competitors without any celebrity endorsement deals, and close to zero on net. The day-to-day pattern of competitors' abnormal returns correlates strongly with both sponsors' returns, and with our auxiliary measures of news/search intensity; on days of high search interest in the term "Tiger Woods endorsement," non-endorsement-intensive competitors' gains are more positive, and more positive relative to endorsement-intensive competitors.
In the context of prior work linking stock market value to celebrity endorsements, our first result provides clear evidence that in this case, a celebrity endorsement substantively affected stock market value for sponsor firms. Previous evidence of links between endorsements and stock market value has been mixed, because nearly all of that work faces a harder identification problem: it uses initial endorsement announcements, which are likely to be at least partially anticipated by traders, to estimate gains in firm value. 1 The event we examine was by all accounts a complete surprise to the market, making it a near-ideal natural experiment from an event study perspective.
A corollary of our result is that endorsement deals carry substantial risk. While we cannot compare the losses sustained by sponsors to their initial gains, the losses we estimate are large.
That suggests taking a view of celebrity endorsement as a risky investment rather than a simple short-run cost-benefit tradeoff-particularly if a firm plans to complement the endorsement deal with co-investment in a new product or brand, as Nike did with its golf line, and as Electronic Arts and Gatorade did with their "Tiger-specific" products.
Our finding that sponsors' losses are competitors' gains is fairly novel in the context of previous work correlating endorsements with firm value. We are aware of one previous study (Mathur, Mathur, and Rangan (1997) ) examining competitors' returns after Michael Jordan's announced return to professional basketball, but that study finds "only very weak evidence" of a link between an endorser's behavior and competitors' stock market value.
Important corroborative evidence for these findings, albeit using a completely different method and data set, comes from a recent paper by Chung, Derdenger, and Srinivasan (2011) . That paper estimates a structural demand model of the golf ball industry, and uses the Tiger Woods scandal to 1 Louie, Kulik, and Jacobson (2001) is a notable exception. We discuss that work below.
2 identify changes in demand. The authors find that demand for Nike golf balls shifts down following the scandal, significantly reducing Nike's flow of profits from selling golf balls. The empirics suggest both that total demand for golf balls fell (i.e., that there is a category effect), and that competitors of Nike experienced relative gains (i.e., that there is a business-stealing effect).
We view our incorporation of Google Insights search intensity into the empirics as promising for future work at the intersection of marketing and finance. A small but rapidly growing set of papers in finance establishes that Google search intensity is correlated with stock prices more generally (see in particular Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) and papers citing that work). A recent paper by Du and Kamakura (forthcoming) shows that Google search intensity and other data allowing "quantitative trendspotting" explain new car sales. Our work complements that other work by linking of marketing-related search intensity to stock prices.
Finally, the difference in competitors' returns when we stratify by competitors' "endorsementintensity" is provocative evidence about how markets price reputation risk associated with celebrity endorsements. The relatively more negative returns for endorsement-intensive competitors suggests that the scandal changed market-wide perceptions of risk associated with investments in celebrity endorsement. We are not aware of any previous work examining this issue, and in the conclusion we discuss the implications of this finding in more detail.
An important caveat is that while our data display useful heterogeneity on some dimensions (the set of affected firms, their sponsorship intensity, and day-by-day events/returns following the scandal), we are still essentially examining a single event: one scandal involving one celebrity endorser and a particular set of sponsors. It would be unwise to extrapolate our findings to the larger population of celebrity endorsers, or to other types of scandal. One would need to conduct a broader historical study of many past events to make more general statements about celebrity endorsements and firm value.
Celebrity Endorsements and Firm Stock Market Value
Celebrity product endorsements, and endorsements by professional athletes in particular, are a critical element of brand strategy. 2 The key question from a firm's perspective, of course, is whether a celebrity endorsement generates value sufficient to offset its possibly considerable cost.
Quantifying that benefit-cost tradeoff is hard, and consequently the question of whether celebrity 2 See, e.g., the many references in Ding, Molchanov, and Stork (2008) , and an earlier survey by Erdogan (1999) .
endorsements are value-enhancing remains open.
Stock market event studies provide one window into measuring the returns associated with celebrity endorsements. A firm's stock price reflects expectations about the discounted value of future economic profits. If retaining a valuable endorser changes those expectations-say, by increasing expected future sales-then an announcement of celebrity endorsement should generate a "kick" in the stock price. Conversely, an adverse (reputation-damaging) event or the departure of a valuable endorser might move those expectations about future profits downward, which should result in a lower stock price. In addition to this level effect, establishing a link between brand value and an endorser's reputation creates risk. Investors should price that "reputation risk" as they would any other component of risk in a firm's stock, and should also price changes in how markets perceive the risk of celebrity endorsements.
The stock market-based method does face empirical difficulties, most notably the anticipation problem. If, for example, a celebrity endorsement deal is widely anticipated long before its formal announcement, buyers and sellers of the sponsor's stock will have fully priced all of the gains associated with the deal well before the announcement itself, and the actual announcement will change neither expectations nor stock prices. That means that the empirically cleanest type of event to use for quantifying changes in firm value is a surprise, whether it is good or bad, because surprises by definition avoid the anticipation problem.
In the context of the identification issue on the front end, it is not surprising that previous studies attempting to link celebrity endorsements and corporate sponsorship to stock market value have found mixed evidence. 3 We are aware of one study examining announcements of "bad news" for celebrity endorsers (including athletes and entertainers); bad news is often, though not always, more of a surprise than announcements of endorsement/sponsorship deals, and therefore provides cleaner identification. In that paper, Louie, Kulik, and Jacobson (2001) find that bad news with little "culpability" for the endorser (such as a career-ending injury) generates gains for sponsors, while bad news with more culpability (such as a DUI arrest) generates losses. 4 The scandal that 3 Farrell, Karels, and Montfort (2000) find that Tiger Woods' endorsement deal announcements generated stock market value for Nike, but not for American Express or Fortune (Titleist). Agrawal and Kamakura (1995) , Mishra, Jr, and Bhabra (1997) , Miyazaki and Morgan (2001) , Pruitt, Cornwell, and Clark (2004) and Samitasa and Kenourgiosb (2008) find that endorsements/sponsorships generate positive stock market returns. Mathur, Mathur, and Rangan (1997) find that Michael Jordan's return to professional basketball generated positive returns for his sponsors. find that celebrity endorsements generate positive stock market returns for a wide set of celebrities. On the other hand, Fizel, McNeil, and Smaby (2008) , Farrell and Frame (1997) , Pruitt (2009), Cornwell, Pruitt, and Ness (2001) and Ding, Molchanov, and Stork (2008) find weaker evidence, or even evidence (in the case of Olympic sponsorships) negative returns following endorsement/sponsorship announcements.
4 That paper also adds to an interesting set of studies asking how negative information about an endorser affects 4 we examine falls squarely in the second ("more culpability") class.
Previous studies also may contain mixed findings for two other reasons. First, it is probably true that while some firms may capture rents when they sign celebrity endorsers, others may not.
Some celebrities may command payments that completely offset any incremental profit generated for the sponsor firm. And second, some firms may simply overestimate the gains associated with an endorsement deal; by a winner's curse logic, those firms should in fact be the ones who sign celebrities more often.
An advantage in our case is that the scandal was a surprise. Before the accident, Tiger Woods was widely acknowledged to have the most valuable "brand" of any athlete in the world-a fact accruing both from his athletic success and from his clean public image. Until 2009 he routinely placed in the top 5 of the Forbes "Celebrity 100" list of most influential celebrities world-wide.
So our setting is certainly one in which stock prices might plausibly reveal the economic object of interest, because there is no evidence that the market anticipated any of the bad news associated with the scandal. The flipside of that, and a limitation of our approach, is that while our method can estimate by how much sponsors' expected future profits fall after the scandal, it cannot estimate the gain in expected future profits that firms initially experienced from the endorsement deal.
Another benefit associated with our example is that Tiger Woods endorses several products rather than just one. This allows us to estimate stock market effects across a wide set of otherwise unrelated firms, and gives us more statistical power than one would have if the estimates were confined to a single sponsor firm. 5 We can further improve the power of our tests by examining how returns and information comove (or do not co-move) during the time period of the scandal. Although the scandal was a surprise, news related to the scandal, and endorsement-related news in particular, disseminated gradually after the date of the accident, and did so in a way we can measure both quantitatively and qualitatively. As we discuss below, of the fifteen trading days following the accident only three or four were days on which there was significant endorsement-related news; the other days were largely quiet. Our Google search intensity data, which we describe below, confirm this view by identifying clear peak periods of interest coinciding with the timing of endorsement-related news.
The endorsement-related activity lags the onset of the broader scandal significantly; for example, Google searches for "Tiger Woods endorsement" did not take off until a few days after the accident, brand perception and firm value. See, e.g., Till and Shimp (1998) . 5 In this respect, our work follows that of Farrell, Karels, and Montfort (2000) and Mathur, Mathur, and Rangan (1997) .
did not peak until ten trading days after the accident, and experienced a third bump on December 14, 2009. Variation in news/search intensity during the scandal allows us to ask whether the pattern of stock price changes during the scandal matches the pattern of news/interest. We augment the analysis by collecting data for a wide set of competitors to Tiger Woods' sponsors. These data allow us to estimate whether sponsors' losses after the scandal are competitors' gains. Whether that is true depends on substitutability between sponsors' products and competitors' products, and the extent to which celebrity endorsements create new demand, or merely steal business from competitors. Understanding whether celebrity endorsement is business-stealing or pure value creation is important both conceptually and for business strategy, but there has been very little empirical work examining the question. 6 . Finally, the dramatic nature of this particular scandal-an extremely damaging set of events for the world's leading endorser-allows us to examine the general role of reputation risk in determining firm value for endorsement-intensive firms in general. Following the Tiger Woods scandal, the media devoted substantial attention to that risk; for example, a Google search for "celebrity reputation risk" yields stories largely written about Tiger Woods after the scandal. There is also evidence of a market response, by insurance companies offering protection against celebrity reputation risk; a New York Times article written January 31, 2010 was titled "Insuring Endorsements Against Athletes Scandals," and stated this: 7
In the wake of the Tiger Woods scandal, insurers are being inundated with inquiries from corporations seeking to protect their investments, their brands and even their sales when their celebrity endorsers suffer public embarrassment...In a new wrinkle, more companies are trying to insure against the potential loss of sales when an athlete product endorser is involved in a scandal.
Whether the scandal in fact changed market-level perceptions of reputation risk is of course an empirical question. We explore that question by estimating post-scandal stock price changes for two subsets of sponsors' competitors: those who are themselves endorsement-intensive, and those who are not endorsement-intensive. If the scandal sent a market-wide signal about reputation risk, one might expect that competitors with endorsement deals would fare relatively worse than 6 As we noted above, the exceptions are the work by Mathur, Mathur, and Rangan (1997) , who find that competitors to Michael Jordan's sponsors experience "very weak" stock price changes after Jordan's return to professional basketball, and the work by Chung, Derdenger, and Srinivasan (2011) showing that competitors of Nike gained golf ball sales after the scandal 7 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/01/sports/01insurance.html.
Prior to November 2009, Tiger Woods' annual endorsement income was estimated to be roughly $100 million, a figure roughly twice as large as that for any other athlete. 8 We are able to identify seven publicly owned, domestically traded companies with which Tiger Woods had an endorsement or sponsorship deal as of November 27, 2009. We list those companies in Table A .1. 9 While the details of most contracts are private, the five most valuable contracts were seemingly with Accenture, Gillette, Nike, PepsiCo (Gatorade) and Electronic Arts (EA). 10 In the empirical work below, we estimate some stock price effects for this subset of "Primary" firms.
Some sponsors augment the endorsement relationship by making complementary co-investments in product lines, brand name or other assets, the value of which might also be tied to the endorser's reputation. There are three such firms in our sample. Nike has a considerable complementary investment in the Nike golf product line, which did not exist prior to the Tiger Woods endorsement contract. Electronic Arts sells the "EA Tiger Woods" line of video games, and recently launched a new "Tiger Woods Online" video game. Gatorade invested considerable resources in developing a "Tiger Focus" drink.
We draw this distinction because for firms with such co-investments linked to the "Tiger brand,"
the link between reputation risk and firm value could go beyond the dollar value of the endorsement contract and its short-run effect on sales/profits. The Nike golf line, for example, is a brand with considerable asset value, accumulated via Nike's substantial up-front and ongoing investment in R&D, physical capital and brand equity. For firms with such complementary investments, changes in stock prices will reflect changes in the value of those assets, as well as changes in direct sales associated with the endorsement deal. In the empirical work below we estimate stock price effects for the "Tiger Brand" group of Nike, Electronic Arts and Gatorade: the set of firms with substantial complementary investments associated with Tiger Woods.
The Timeline of the Scandal
The scandal began with a car accident on the evening of November 27, 2009-a Friday, meaning that the first trading day after the release of "news" was Monday November 30, 2009. 11 Following the night of the accident, several potentially reputation-damaging pieces of information emerged, primarily involving extramarital affairs. Events culminated ten trading days later (December 11, 2009 ) with Tiger Woods' announcement of an 'indefinite leave' from golf. 12 Table 1 summarizes these events day-by-day, starting one week before the scandal, and ending on December 18, 2009-fifteen trading days after the accident. Beyond the fifteen trading-day horizon we lose statistical precision, so we confine ourselves to this window rather than some longer time period.
As illustrative evidence regarding the rise and decline of media interest in the story, we examine the results of Google Insights searches related to the scandal. 13 Previous work [e.g., Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) and follow-on studies] has shown that Google search intensity is correlated with stock price changes, implying that search intensity captures investor attention. Google's Insights data quantify internet interest in a subject on a 100-point scale, as measured by the popularity of keyword searches. Data are normalized search-by-search, with 100 representing peak activity during the search period. To be clear, the scale is informative within a search rather than across searches: within a particular search "100" always implies twice as much search activity as "50," but the peak values of 100 across two different searches may represent different absolute levels of interest.
The most popular three-word search terms following the scandal were "Tiger Woods accident"
and "Tiger Woods wife." 14 Figure 1 shows interest in these terms starting on November 26, 2009 and ending on December 18, 2009. Interest in these topics was at zero according to Google
Insights before then, suggesting that the pre-accident National Enquirer allegation was not taken particularly seriously. Interest in the "accident" search peaks on the day of the accident, then dies out quickly. Interest in the "wife" search builds after the accident and peaks on December 2-3, the latter date being that on which Tiger Woods issued a statement admitting "transgressions."
Interest in the "wife" search diminishes until a resurgence on December 8th, then falls again. By 11 For a timeline and some details about the allegations, see http://www.montrealgazette.com/sports/timeline+ Tiger+Woods+decline/3374668/story.html.
12 One piece of scandal-related news predates the accident by four days: allegations of an affair in the National Enquirer, released on November 23, 2009. We consider the possible effect of that early news in the empirical work below, and find that it does not appear relevant.
13 One can find the search page here: http://www.google.com/insights/search/. 14 We observe this by starting with a general search for "Tiger Woods." Given a general starting search, Google Insights shows a rank ordering of the most popular refined search terms associated with the general search.
December 18th, interest appears to have fully waned. Data over longer post-scandal windows show no resurgence in interest over the next two years.
The Scandal and Sponsor Firms
Returning to Table 1 , we also document endorsement-related news during the scandal. Endorsementrelated announcements lag general news about the scandal; the first piece of endorsement-related news came on December 3, when Nike and Gillette issued press releases confirming support for Woods. On December 8, Gatorade announced cancellation of its Tiger Woods-branded sports drink; the announcement came late in the day, after the close of trading. 15 The next pieces of news, clustered on December 11 and over the following weekend, include Accenture dropping Woods, and Gillette announcing that it would "limit" Woods' role in marketing going forward. These pieces of information coincide with the announcement on December 11 of Woods' leave from golf. While we do not extend the window of our analysis beyond December 18 because we have limited statistical power after then, it is perhaps worth noting that AT&T dropped Tiger Woods on December 31,
2009, and Gatorade dropped Woods on February 26, 2010.
Figure 1 sheds light on the relative importance of these events by plotting Google search intensity for the term "Tiger Woods endorsement." That search term takes a value of zero until the day after the accident, and has its first spike on December 3-the Nike/Gillette press release day. Its peak is on December 8/9 following the Gatorade announcement, and interest remains high until after the announcement on December 13 that Accenture was dropping Woods. While the correlation is not perfect, it is high-Google intensity corresponds closely to the pattern of endorsement-related announcements following the scandal.
As further suggestive evidence that the scandal mattered for sponsor firms, we show in Figure 2 the average Google search intensity for our seven sponsor firms between January 2009 and January 2010. We construct two averages. One average uses search intensity based on parent company name and the other uses search intensity based on the brand name endorsed by Tiger Woods (see Table A .1 for details). This distinction matters only for two of the seven sponsors (Pepsi/Gatorade and Proctor and Gamble/Gillette). Also, we use "Electronic Arts" as the search term for both parent and brand, because a search for the Tiger Woods-themed golf video game ("Tiger Woods PGA Tour Golf") would spuriously capture broader searches for Tiger Woods.
The shaded area on the figure covers the two weeks of peak interest in the scandal. The brandspecific average peaks during that week, meaning that for our seven brands, this time period was on average the period of greatest worldwide Google search interest over the preceding year. Three of the seven brands in our sponsor group experience the peak (=100) of their 2009 search intensity during the two weeks of the scandal, and AT&T peaks during the week of December 31, when it announced dropping Woods.
The parent-specific pattern is similar, although there are three other time periods in which parent-level intensity exceeds that during the scandal. The first comes during and is driven by a 100 search intensity level for Accenture. That week coincides with the Accenture Match Play Championship, a golf tournament in which Tiger Woods played, and a key part of Accenture's Tiger Woods-related marketing activities. A second peak comes during November 8-14, and is driven by a 100 intensity value for Electronic Arts, which announced a substantial negative earnings report and layoffs during that week. 16 The third peak is during September 20-26 and driven by Gillette; while we can find no corporate announcements by Gillette during that week, the rock band U2 played a concert at Gillette Stadium in Foxborough, Massachusetts, which may have driven spurious interest in "Gillette" as a search term.
Looking at the gap between the parent-specific and brand-specific average lines is also informative. The averages move together quite closely for nearly all of 2009, but deviate by the greatest amount precisely at the peak of the scandal-when interest in the brands relative to the parents would have been highest, based on affiliation with Tiger Woods.
All of this evidence points to a substantive qualitative relationship between the events of the scandal, attention to endorsement values, and interest in sponsor firms. Google intensity correlates quite closely with endorsement-related news, Google intensity for our sponsor firms correlates quite closely with endorsement-related news, and prior work shows that search intensity is correlated with changes in firm value. Our empirical work examines these links more formally.
Estimated Stock Market Effects of the Scandal
To estimate stock price changes our set of sponsor firms and competitors following November 27 2009, we estimate an event study. Our method is standard in marketing, economics and finance, and as we discuss above has been employed previously in studies linking stock market value to 16 The "mini-peak" in February 1-7 is also EA-driven and coincides with another negative announcement.
celebrity endorsements. 17
Our primary specification is:
where,
• R it = the return on shares of sponsor i at time t,
• R m t = the return on the Dow Jones value-weighted total market index at time t, • δ s = the abnormal return on day s after the accident,
• D st = a dummy variable equal to one during day s after the accident,
The specification is a standard market model where the dependent variable is a sponsor's daily percentage return exclusive of dividends, from Wharton Research Data Services and the Center for Research in Stock Prices (CRSP). The independent variables include a value-weighted total market return. The model allows for sponsor-specific daily mean returns (alphas) and correlations with market/competitor returns (betas). Our estimation window begins three months before the accident date and extends to December 18, 2009. Event date "zero" is November 27, and November 30, 2009 is the first trading day after the event date.
Our model yields estimates of daily abnormal returns, δ s , which are deviations of actual returns on the days after the scandal from those predicted by the model. We weight observations by market capitalization, effectively estimating the abnormal returns that one would earn by holding a valueweighted portfolio of Tiger Woods' sponsors. 18 We also estimate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)-which are running sums of the daily abnormal returns-starting on November 30th. The CARs estimate sponsors' total loss over a multi-day window starting on event date one, relative to the market returns. In the results below we report abnormal returns and CARs for windows extending up to fifteen trading days after the event date.
When examining the effect of a single event on multiple firms, it is important to adjust the estimated standard errors for the contemporaneous correlation of sponsor-specific errors on the same day. We use the procedure in Salinger (1992) for calculating standard errors on the cumulative abnormal returns. The procedure involves making a simple transformation to the data matrix that yields correct standard errors. We also omit observations for the week preceding November 30, 2009. Including them does not change the results, and we find no evidence of pre-event abnormal returns.
In some cases we are interested in examining abnormal returns that vary across firms within the same day. We estimate those using the more flexible specification:
This more flexible specification allows us to conduct non-parametric sign and rank tests regarding the post-event abnormal returns δ is . In both tests the null hypothesis is that post-event abnormal returns are centered on zero, which is what one would expect if the post-event period contains no systematic news about firm value. Rejecting the null suggests that some (either positive or negative) information affected sponsor firms' returns. In these models we also correct for contemporaneous correlation of errors across sponsor firms.
Given that we also collect data on competitors' returns, it would be possible to estimate specifications including both the market return and a value-weighted portfolio of competitors' returns. This is sometimes done because it can control more completely for confounding industry-specific contemporaneous influences on sponsors' stock prices. Including competitors' returns is less correct, on the other hand, if the scandal itself affected competitors' returns. We indeed find that to be the case, in results presented below. We therefore present here only results relative to the market (i.e., the abnormal returns estimated from equation 1 above). We do show the results relative to the market as well as competitors' returns in a working paper (available on the authors' web sites). CARs. In every model the point estimates are fairly flat and not statistically significant until eight trading days after the accident, after which the CARs turn sharply negative and remain so until the end of our fifteen-day event window. By and large the estimates are statistically significant, particularly later in the event window and for the Primary and Tiger Brand sub-samples. The point estimates for the smaller sub-groups are also larger (more negative). Referring to the first three columns, in the Primary subsample the 10-(15-)day CAR shows a loss of 3.0%(5.3%), and in the Tiger Brand subsample the 10-(15-)day CAR shows a loss of 3.4%(5.8%).
Primary Results
The second three columns of 2 show average daily ARs, and below those the results of the sign and rank tests. One can see that the largest negative returns occur in two clusters, 3-4 and 8-9
trading days after the onset of the scandal, corresponding to December 2-3 and December 9-10 respectively. The bottom four rows use the firm-specific daily abnormal returns δ is (not shown in the table) to conduct both sign and rank tests over 10-day and 15-day windows. The null hypothesis in these tests is that returns are centered on zero, and the alternative (one-tailed) hypothesis in each test is that the returns are centered on a negative value, indicating the systematic release 
Endorsement-related News, Search Intensity and Abnormal Returns
We now tie the day-by-day pattern of abnormal returns summarized in Table 2 to the patterns of news/search behavior we documented in Table 1 and Figure 1 . This analysis corroborates the view that our estimated abnormal returns are related to the Tiger Woods scandal, rather than some other factor(s).
We first approach the question graphically. Figure 2 plots the Google Insights index for "Tiger
Woods endorsement" over trading days 1-15 in the event window. On the same axis we also plot the negative of average abnormal returns for sponsor firms over the event window, using our standard groupings of sponsors; each point on the figure corresponds to one coefficient from the first three columns of Table 2 . Plotting the negative of abnormal returns makes easier the visual comparison between higher (more positive) search intensity and larger (more negative) abnormal returns for sponsor firms. 19 The figure shows a strong link between Google search intensity and daily abnormal returns. Search intensity peaks on December 9, and that is the day with the largest (negative) abnormal return for any group of firms. Day-by-day movements up/down in search intensity also correlate with abnormal returns.
We next undertake a more formal statistical analysis linking endorsement-related news/search intensity to the magnitude of abnormal returns. The model for this analysis is:
•δ is = the estimated abnormal return on shares of firm i on event date s from equation (1),
• N ews s = a time-varying measure of news/search intensity,
• is = an error term.
With seven firms and fifteen trading days during the event window, we have a total of 105 observations for these regressions when all sponsor firms are included, and 75/45 observations for the Primary/Tiger Brand subsamples.
To fully explore the relationship between search/news intensity and abnormal returns, we use three different measures of news/search intensity. The first is the level of search intensity for "Tiger Woods endorsement" from Google Insights, as shown on Figures 1 and 3 , re-scaled to be between zero and one (rather than between 1 and 100). This takes on a minimum value of 0.07 (on November 30) and a maximum value of 1.00 (on December 9). Our second measure of search intensity is an indicator taking on a value of one on days with a Google Insights score above 25 (0.25), and zero otherwise; that occurs on December 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15 and 17 of 2009. 20 Finally, we include a 19 Specifying the relationship this way maintains the assumption that all news during the event window had a negative effect. We have also constructed, but do not present here, a figure correlating search intensity with the absolute value of returns; that assumes that search intensity could lead to large abnormal returns in either direction. That figure looks quite similar, because most of the largest daily returns are negative. 20 We have also tried other cutoffs such as 0.50 or 0.75, or sets of indicators based on quartile cutoffs; the results are qualitatively similar. We present results using the 0.25 cutoff here because it is generous relative to the other two measures in the table in terms of classifying "high" intensity, and therefore provides a useful comparison to those narrower measures.
14 qualitative indicator, self-defined, equal to one on the "endorsement-related news days" identified in Table 1 : December 3, 8, 9 and 14. 21 Table 3 presents results from these models. With every specification of news/search intensity, the coefficients show more negative abnormal returns on days of greater news/search intensity. The effects are larger for the Tiger Brand firms than for the sample as a whole. In the first set of rows, the point estimates imply negative abnormal returns of 0.7%-2.6% on days with search intensity equal to 1.00, relative to days with search intensity equal to 0.00. The second set of rows shows negative abnormal returns of 0.4%-1.0% on days with search intensity greater than 0.25. And finally, the coefficients in the last set of rows imply negative abnormal returns of 0.2%-1.4%.
Two important patterns emerge in these results. First, the correlation between news/search intensity is much stronger for the "Tiger Brand" firms than for the other firms in the set of sponsors-note the significantly higher r-squared terms in the last column of results. This is what one would expect if the results reflect the downside of the scandal and the Tiger Brand firms had more at stake. Second, and perhaps more important, our objectively measured search intensity variable (the Google Insights measure) significantly outperforms our qualitative and subjectivelydefined "news day" measure, in terms of fitting the pattern of abnormal returns. This is a promising result in the context of event studies that attempt to explain abnormal returns, because the Google Insights-based variable avoids issues related to researcher-defined measures of which days after an event are "important."
As a robustness check, we show in Table A .3 the results of similar models that use other search terms related to the scandal. The first two sets of rows use the search intensity for the "Tiger Woods accident" search, and the second sets of rows use the "Tiger Woods wife" search. 22 We show two specifications for each alternative search measure: one including the "Tiger Woods endorsement" search intensity (from Table 3 ) and one omitting that variable.
The results show quite clearly that while endorsement-related search intensity correlates quite strongly with sponsors' abnormal returns, non-endorsement-related but still scandal-related search intensity is unrelated to the pattern of abnormal returns. The more general scandal-related search terms are closer to zero in point terms, and never statistically significant. Furthermore, their inclusion leaves the magnitude and significance of the endorsement-related coefficient unchanged.
This provides further evidence that our findings reflect something specific to the endorsementrelated effect of the scandal.
Competitor Returns and Endorsement Intensity
In this section, we examine returns for our sponsors' competitors. For each of the seven firms in our sponsor sample we collect daily return data for ten competitors, meaning that we examine returns for as many as seventy competitors in the work below. Some competitors move in or out of the sample during the estimation window, are not traded on a U.S. exchange, or are one of our sponsors, meaning that we do not always have data for all seventy firms. The competitor portfolio includes the first ten firms listed by Google Finance as "competitors" of the sponsor-meaning the sponsor's parent company. 23 Table A .1 lists competitors for each sponsor; we include only competitors traded on U.S. stock exchanges.
Our analysis of competitors' returns focuses on two questions. First, we ask whether the scandal appears to generate abnormal returns for competitors. One might imagine that losses for sponsor firms could be gains for rivals of sponsors, if celebrity endorsements lead to business-stealing and that business-stealing reverses after a scandal. Alternatively, it is possible that losses for sponsors would not affect competitors' returns, if celebrity endorsements simply create new value in a market (perhaps relative to other markets, perhaps not). It might even be possible that one firm's losses could spill over to all competitors in a "category," although this is perhaps more plausible for some products (e.g., golf balls) than for others (e.g., sports drinks).
A second question is whether those competitors who are themselves endorsement-intensive, meaning that they also use celebrity endorsements as part of their marketing efforts, fared differently from those competitors with no links to celebrities. The purpose of the second test, as we note above, is to test for broader impacts of the Tiger Woods scandal. Given the prominence of Tiger Woods as an endorser and his arguably impeccable reputation prior to the scandal, it is possible that the scandal sent a negative market-wide signal about risk associated with any endorsement deal. We classify a competitor as "endorsement intensive" if a Google search for "[competitor name] celebrity endorsement" over a window [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] reveals that the competitor had at least one celebrity endorsement deal during our event window (listed on the first page of Google's results). Table A .1 lists our competitors and whether we classify them as endorsement-intensive. This is 23 We have estimated the model using the first five or three competitors, and also using the Yahoo! Finance competitor list. Varying the specification of competitors' returns has no effect on the results. Nor does weighting competitors' returns equally.
probably conservative, in the sense that relatively few of these firms are as endorsement-intensive as the large firms that Tiger Woods endorses. We have confirmed that our sponsor firms are classified as "endorsement intensive" using this method. The endorsement intensity searches were conducted on various days during April 2010. 24 The model for this analysis is the standard market model, as in Equation (1), but with competitors' returns as the dependent variable. We weight the returns by competitor value (market capitalization). We estimate competitors' returns for all competitors, as well as competitors to the Primary/Tiger Brand groups. Table 4 The more interesting results are those in the next six columns, which show that endorsementintensive competitors fared significantly worse than non-intensive competitors. The middle three columns show that after event day two non-intensive competitors' returns turn negative, and are statistically significantly negative on day 14. More important, the difference between returns for endorsement-intensive and non-intensive competitors is economically meaningful and statistically significant, at least for the Primary/Three sub-samples. For the Primary subsample the CARs are significant at 10% or 5% on all days after trading day 8 (December 9 2009), and range from -2.1% to -3.3% in point terms, meaning that endorsement-intensive competitors lost roughly 2-3% of value relative to their non-intensive competitors. The point estimates are larger for Tiger Brand competitors but less significant statistically, reflecting the smaller sample size.
The relative gains for competitors without endorsement deals suggest the losses for sponsor firms were at least in part gains for competitors-in other words, that celebrity endorsements transfer value across firms. But the fact that being endorsement-intensive was treated more harshly in the market suggests a second effect-that the scandal sent a negative market-wide signal, as suggested in the New York Times article above, about the possible downside of celebrity endorsements. For endorsement-intensive competitors, the net effect of the business-stealing effect (a gain) and the reputation risk effect (a loss) appears to be nearly a wash. If we pool all competitors the average CARs for the pooled group are close to (and not significantly different from) zero.
To confirm that our findings for competitors are endorsement-related, we estimate a series of regressions mirroring those in Table 3 , estimating the link between competitors' abnormal returns and measures of news/search intensity. We allow the relationships to differ for endorsement-intensive and non-intensive competitors by including an interaction term. Table 5 shows the results of these models. The broad pattern is of a positive and statistically significant relationship between endorsement-related news/search intensity and abnormal returns for the baseline set of non-intensive competitors, and a relationship for endorsement-intensive competitors that is significantly less positive and close to zero on net. The effects estimated in this table are generally smaller than those estimated for sponsors. In short: competitors' returns during the scandal are greatest precisely when sponsors' losses are greatest, unless the competitors themselves are endorsement-intensive.
In the top rows, the All and Tiger Brand coefficients show a positive and significant relationship between the continuously measured "Tiger Woods endorsement" search intensity variable and abnormal returns for non-intensive competitors. Those coefficients are also positive and significant for all groups using the discrete "intensity>0.25" variable. They are smaller and less significant using our qualitative self-defined "news days" variable. The pattern for the interaction terms is similar, in terms of size and significance. The interaction terms measure the difference between returns for non-intensive and endorsement-intensive competitors-the sum of the two coefficients measures the net effect on endorsement-intensive competitors. We also observe, as we did with sponsors' abnormal returns, that the quantitative intensity measures from Google Insights correlate more strongly with abnormal returns than does our self-defined "endorsement-related news day" variable.
While we do not report the results, we have also estimated a model that pools all sponsors and competitors, and estimates overall (value-weighted) effects on the "category portfolio." These models show negative, small (less than 1%) and borderline statistically significant effects overall.
In other words, the net effect on this entire set of firms is a small and weakly significant loss in value, with significant "within-category" transfers from sponsor firms to non-intensive competitors of sponsor firms. These results are broadly consistent with the results in Chung, Derdenger, and Srinivasan (2011) from the golf ball market.
Robustness Checks and Caveats
While we do not present them here, we have conducted a variety of robustness checks. We have estimated the models using a variety of estimation windows, with little effect on the results. 26 We have estimated models that include the pre-event week, or drop up to a month's worth of pre-event data. We have varied the weighting scheme (using time-invariant market capitalization weights, for example). We have also varied the reference index for the market return, using in some specifications the NASDAQ, in others the S&P 500, and in others the index on which the company's stock is traded. These modifications to the specification do not change the results.
Another robustness issue arises because PepsiCo announced a negative earnings revision on December 9, 2009, and one might worry that the announcement contaminates our results. In unreported specifications (which we show in an earlier working paper version), we break our 'Tiger Brand' subsample of EA, Nike into two groups: PepsiCo and the other two firms. The abnormal return for PepsiCo on December 9 is indeed negative and significant, but so are abnormal returns for the other two firms, and the point estimates are very close. While one cannot rule out a negative stock price effect of the announcement for PepsiCo, the pattern of results is consistent with the release on December 9 of bad news common to Nike, EA and PepsiCo.
In order to further explore whether our event window contains substantive events for sponsor firms other than the scandal, we have examined Googles news headlines for the event period, again using Google Insights. Two firms EA and TLC Vision have no headlines. Three Gillette, Nike and Accenture have one headline, all having to do with Tiger Woods and endorsements. PepsiCo has one headline, discussed above. AT&T has one headline, on December 18 2009, mentioning its improved wireless service in Rochester NY. It does not appear that this was a period during which our set of sponsor firms experienced other substantive events affecting firm value.
A final point concerns interpretation of the results. Ideally, one would want to interpret any abnormal returns as measuring percentage changes in the expected value of future economic profits.
In our case that is hard, if not impossible, for a few reasons. Most of our sponsor firms are large multi-product firms, for which Tiger Woods endorses only a single product; Nike produces many products outside its golf line, for example. Nike's stock price, of course, reflects expectations about its profits from all business lines. So, the percentage change in profits will be weighted by the shares of economic profits flowing from "Tiger-related" products and "non-Tiger-related" products. One could proxy for those shares using dollar values of sales-Nike golf, for example, represents roughly ten percent of annual sales for Nike-but there is no guarantee that shares of expected future profit correspond to shares of current dollar sales. Another complicating factor is that if the scandal sent a market-wide signal about celebrity reputation risk, then even the non-Tiger-related business lines might suffer. That would be particularly true for a company like Nike, which is one of the most celebrity endorsement-intensive firms in the world. For these reasons, our results should be taken as indicating the direction and overall dollar value (percentage change × market capitalization) of abnormal returns, not as indicating percentage changes in Tiger-related economic profit.
Discussion and Conclusion
The Tiger Woods scandal provides a unique opportunity to understand more about the relationship between stock market value and celebrity endorsements. Our first result confirms a direct dimension of that link: the market value of Tiger Woods' sponsors fell substantively after the scandal broke, relative to the market values of firms without such endorsement deals. That finding is informative in the context of the mixed evidence from previous work.
Beyond that, we shed light on some previously under-studied aspects of the endorsement/stock price relationship. Firms with substantial co-investments in new products linked to the "Tiger brand" suffered greater declines in value, presumably reflecting declines in the asset values or brand equity associated with those products. We do not estimate whether our results reflect longrun declines in value, due to the limited statistical power of longer-run tests, but we have no evidence over as long as one month after the scandal of any reversion in prices. The efficient markets hypothesis would suggest that markets should immediately price the downside of scandals correctly on average; of course, that need not have been the case in this specific instance. Further work using more data from a broader set of scandals might be able to shed light on whether there is any systematic under-reaction or over-reaction to celebrity scandals. 27 We also relate novel auxiliary data from Google Insights to abnormal returns during the scandal.
The level of interest in the search term "Tiger Woods endorsement" explains nearly forty percent of the variation across firms and days in abnormal returns following the scandal, and does so in an intuitive way. The search intensity variable significantly outperforms our own qualitative measure of which days were endorsement-newsworthy, suggesting promising avenues for future research.
Our estimates of competitors' gains represent new evidence regarding how far-reaching the stock market effects of celebrity endorsements can be. Competitors to sponsor firms measurably gained value after the scandal, relative to the rest of the market. That finding has implications for business strategy, in that competitors' endorsement deals are one more factor affecting firm value, and can transfer value across firms.
Finally, we find compelling evidence that how competitors fared during the scandal depended on whether they also had celebrity endorsers or not; this result is confirmed by the post-event relationship between competitors' abnormal returns and endorsement-related news/search intensity. Along with the anecdotal evidence regarding how the scandal altered perceptions of celebrity endorsement reputation risk, this evidence suggests a regime change in how equity markets priced reputation risk. Whether that regime change persists is an open question, but if insurance companies indeed start offering "reputation risk insurance" then that view will have passed a convincing market test. 
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December 12, 2009
Gillette announces that it is "limiting" Woods' role in marketing.
December 13, 2009
Accenture drops Woods. Table 1 . "Primary" includes Nike, EA, Accenture, PepsiCo (Gatorade) and P&G (Gillette). "Tiger Brand" includes Nike, EA and PepsiCo. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) or better. Shaded cells indicate negative values. Sign and rank tests p-values use the full set of firm-day-specific abnormal returns, estimated using the model in equation (2). For the sign and rank tests the null hypothesis is that returns are centered on zero. Table 1 for details. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) or better. Table A1 . "All firms," "Primary" and "Tiger Brand" include competitors of each group. "Endorsement intensive" firms are those for which a Google search of "[company name] endorsement deals" yields one or more hits describing an endorsement deal during the event window. "Difference" columns show differences between endorsementintensive and non-intensive competitors. Event date is November 27, 2009. Estimation window begins three months before event date, and ends one week before event date. Standard errors are adjusted for contemporaneous correlation across firms. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) or better. Table A1 ). First set of rows use the level of "Tiger Woods endorsement" search intensity (on a [0, 1] scale) to measure endorsementrelated news. Second set of rows use an indicator equal to one if "Tiger Woods endorsement" intensity exceeds 0.25, and zero otherwise. Third set of rows use indicator variables equal to one on December 3, December 9, December 11 and December 14; see Table 1 for details. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). Notes: Search intensity is from http://www.google.com/insights/search/. Search intensity is normalized within each term, with peak volume at 100 and lower numbers representing percentage of peak volume. "Tiger Woods accident" and "Tiger Woods wife" are the top-ranked searches listed by Google insights following an initial search for "Tiger Woods." Notes: Search intensity is from http://www.google.com/insights/search/, as in Table 1 . Abnormal returns are plotted as the negative of coefficients from Table 2 . Figure 1 . Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) or better.
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